Abstract: 36.307
Many everyday behavioural uses of color vision depend on color naming ability, which is neither measured nor predicted by most standardized tests of color vision, for either normal or anomalous color vision. Here we demonstrate a new method to quantify color naming ability by deriving a compact computational description of individual 3D color spaces. Methods: Individual observers underwent standardized color vision diagnostic tests (including anomaloscope testing) and a series of custom-made color naming tasks using 500 distinct color samples, either CRT stimuli (“light”-based) or Munsell chips (“surface”-based), with both forced- and free-choice color naming paradigms. For each subject, we defined his/her color solid as the set of 3D convex hulls computed for each basic color category from the relevant collection of categorised points in perceptually uniform CIELAB space. From the parameters of the convex hulls, we derived several indices to characterise the 3D structure of the color solid and its inter-individual variations. Using a reference group of 25 normal trichromats (NT), we defined the degree of normality for the shape, location and overlap of each color region, and the extent of “light”-“surface” agreement. Results: Certain features of color perception emerge from analysis of the average NT color solid, e.g.: (1) the white category is slightly shifted towards blue; and (2) the variability in category border location across NT subjects is asymmetric across color space, with least variability in the blue/green region. Comparisons between individual and average NT indices reveal specific naming “deficits”, e.g.: (1) Category volumes for white, green, brown and grey are expanded for anomalous trichromats and dichromats; and (2) the focal structure of color space is disrupted more in protanopia than other forms of anomalous color vision. The indices both capture the structure of subjective color spaces and allow us to quantify inter-individual differences in color naming ability.

Abstract: Brightness induction is the modulation of the perceived intensity of an area by the luminance of surrounding areas and reveals fundamental properties of neural organization in the visual system. Several phenomenological models have been proposed that successfully account for psychophysical data (Pessoa et al. 1995, Blakeslee and McCourt 2004, Barkan et al. 2008, Otazu et al. 2008).
Neurophysiological evidence suggests that brightness information is explicitly represented in V1 and neuronal response modulations have been observed followingluminance changes outside their receptive fields (Rossi and Paradiso, 1999).
In this work we investigate possible neural mechanisms that offer a plausible explanation for such effects. To this end, we consider the model by Z.Li (1999) which is based on biological data and focuses on the part of V1 responsible for contextual influences, namely, layer 2–3 pyramidal cells, interneurons, and horizontal intracortical connections. This model has proven to account for phenomena such as contour detection and preattentive segmentation, which share with brightness induction the relevant effect of contextual influences. In our model, the input to the network is derived from a complete multiscale and multiorientation wavelet decomposition which makes it possible to recover an image reflecting the perceived intensity. The proposed model successfully accounts for well known pyschophysical effects (among them: the White's and modified White's effects, the Todorović, Chevreul, achromatic ring patterns, and grating induction effects). Our work suggests that intra-cortical interactions in the primary visual cortex could partially explain perceptual brightness induction effects and reveals how a common general architecture may account for several different fundamental processes emerging early in the visual pathway.

Abstract: Color constancy (the ability to perceive colors relatively stable under different illuminants) is the result of several mechanisms spread across different neural levels and responding to several visual scene cues. It is usually measured by estimating the perceived color of a grey patch under an illuminant change. In this work, we hypothesize whether chromatic adaptation (without a reference white or grey) could be driven by certain colors, specifically those corresponding to the universal color terms proposed by Berlin and Kay (1969). To this end we have developed a new psychophysical paradigm in which subjects adjust the color of a test patch (in CIELab space) to match their memory of the best example of a given color chosen from the universal terms list (grey, red, green, blue, yellow, purple, pink, orange and brown). The test patch is embedded inside a Mondrian image and presented on a calibrated CRT screen inside a dark cabin. All subjects were trained to “recall” their most exemplary colors reliably from memory and asked to always produce the same basic colors when required under several adaptation conditions. These include achromatic and colored Mondrian backgrounds, under a simulated D65 illuminant and several colored illuminants. A set of basic colors were measured for each subject under neutral conditions (achromatic background and D65 illuminant) and used as “reference” for the rest of the experiment. The colors adjusted by the subjects in each adaptation condition were compared to the reference colors under the corresponding illuminant and a “constancy index” was obtained for each of them. Our results show that for some colors the constancy index was better than for grey. The set of best adapted colors in each condition were common to a majority of subjects and were dependent on the chromaticity of the illuminant and the chromatic background considered.

Abstract: In a previous work (X. Otazu, M. Vanrell, & C. A. Párraga, 2008b), we showed how several brightness induction effects can be predicted using a simple multiresolution wavelet model (BIWaM). Here we present a new model for chromatic induction processes (termed Chromatic Induction Wavelet Model or CIWaM), which is also implemented on a multiresolution framework and based on similar assumptions related to the spatial frequency and the contrast surround energy of the stimulus. The CIWaM can be interpreted as a very simple extension of the BIWaM to the chromatic channels, which in our case are defined in the MacLeod-Boynton (lsY) color space. This new model allows us to unify both chromatic assimilation and chromatic contrast effects in a single mathematical formulation. The predictions of the CIWaM were tested by means of several color and brightness induction experiments, which showed an acceptable agreement between model predictions and psychophysical data.

Abstract: Colours and emotions are associated in languages and traditions. Some of us may convey sadness by saying feeling blue or by wearing black clothes at funerals. The first example is a conceptual experience of colour and the second example is an immediate perceptual experience of colour. To investigate whether one or the other type of experience more strongly drives colour-emotion associations, we tested 64 congenitally red-green colour-blind men and 66 non-colour-blind men. All participants associated 12 colours, presented as terms or patches, with 20 emotion concepts, and rated intensities of the associated emotions. We found that colour-blind and non-colour-blind men associated similar emotions with colours, irrespective of whether colours were conveyed via terms (r = .82) or patches (r = .80). The colour-emotion associations and the emotion intensities were not modulated by participants' severity of colour blindness. Hinting at some additional, although minor, role of actual colour perception, the consistencies in associations for colour terms and patches were higher in non-colour-blind than colour-blind men. Together, these results suggest that colour-emotion associations in adults do not require immediate perceptual colour experiences, as conceptual experiences are sufficient.

Abstract: Brightness induction is the modulation of the perceived intensity of an area by the luminance of surrounding areas. Although striate cortex is traditionally regarded as an area mostly responsive to ensory (i.e. retinal) information,
neurophysiological evidence suggests that perceived brightness information mightbe explicitly represented in V1.
Such evidence has been observed both in anesthetised cats where neuronal response modulations have been found to follow luminance changes outside the receptive felds and in human fMRI measurements. In this work, possible neural mechanisms that ofer a plausible explanation for such phenomenon are investigated. To this end, we consider the model proposed by Z.Li (Li, Network:Comput. Neural Syst., 10 (1999)) which is based on neurophysiological evidence and focuses on the part of V1 responsible for contextual infuences, i.e. layer 2-3 pyramidal cells, interneurons, and horizontal intracortical connections. This model has reproduced other phenomena such as contour detection and preattentive segmentation, which share with brightness induction the relevant efect of contextual infuences. We have extended the original model such that the input to the network is obtained from a complete multiscale and multiorientation wavelet decomposition, thereby allowing the recovery of an image refecting the perceived intensity. The proposed model successfully accounts for well known psychophysical efects for static contexts (among them: the White's and modifed White's efects, the Todorovic, Chevreul, achromatic ring patterns, and grating induction efects) and also for brigthness induction in dynamic contexts defned by modulating the luminance of surrounding areas (e.g. the brightness of a static central area is perceived to vary in antiphase to the sinusoidal luminance changes of its surroundings). This work thus suggests that intra-cortical interactions in V1 could partially explain perceptual brightness induction efects and reveals how a common general architecture may account for several different fundamental processes emerging early in the visual processing pathway.